When You Absolutely, Positively Have to Go for Two: A Constantly Evolving Coaching Guide to the Two-Point Conversion

Decisions, decisions.

Technology has become the bane of our existence.  Just wait for artificial intelligence to rear more of its ugly head.  There may no longer be a need for coaches.  Don’t put it past Jerry Jones to splurge on the first ever A.I. football coach.  Think of all the money he’d save, plus they couldn’t do any worse than they have now.

Ask any college or professional coach, old school or new, about how technology has altered their experience.  I’m not sure whether sabermetrics has made its way to high school coaches yet, but it wouldn’t surprise me.

I’m not going to bore you with online research and the success rate of going for two over the years.  I briefly attempted to look up the frequency with which two-point conversions were attempted and found a million different answers.  It’s like looking up the perfect way to make an old-fashioned.  You’ll find countless ways to construct the drink just as you’ll find infinite different justifications on when, and whether, to go for two.

Within a three-day span, between NFL Weeks Nine and Ten, we saw two coaches take entirely different approaches with regards to the two-point conversion at the end of a game.  Both coaches lost; both coaches were criticized.  This should come as no surprise.

On a Monday night in Kansas City, Todd Bowles’ Tampa Bay Buccaneers were hanging with the two-time defending champion Kansas City Chiefs.  With 27 seconds left in regulation, the Bucs scored a touchdown and were losing by a single point.  Desperately needing a win, rather than go for the two-point conversion, the Bucs opted to kick the extra point, tie the game and try to win things in overtime.

Some agreed with the decision, others did not.

“We wanted to get to overtime. With the wet conditions on the field, we felt we needed to get to overtime. We had our shots, we lost the game,” was Bowles’ response when asked how seriously he considered going for two.  A successful conversion, the ballsier decision, would likely have given the Bucs the win.  A failed conversion would have ended the game right then and there.

The Bucs opted for the extra point and the game went into overtime.  The Chiefs won the coin toss, drove down the field, scored a touchdown first and won the game.  The Bucs traveled back to Tampa with a loss.

Three days later in Baltimore, in a division rivalry thriller, the Cincinnati Bengals were faced with a similar decision.  Down by one, do you go for two and win the game or opt for the extra point, tie and force overtime?  Either decision leaves a sinking hole in your gut but it’s why they get paid the big bucks.

In a must-win game for the Bengals, head coach Zac Taylor, most likely aware of what happened in Kansas City three days earlier, opted to go for two.  Cincinnati failed to convert.  Baltimore won the game.

There’s a school of thought, a “book” if you will.  Although this book doesn’t technically exist, what people refer to when they say “book” are guidelines about when to go for two and when to not.  Situational offense, like hitting on 14, 15 or 16 when the dealer shows a ten.  This book that some coaches swear by, and others scoff at, is based on analytics and, I hate to break it to you, isn’t always right.  Or maybe it is, who the hell knows.  I didn’t write it.  It just eliminates the guesswork and rewards the brave, we think.  It’s easy to say, in retrospect, that Bowles should have gone for two, even though the Bucs had only succeeded on 1 of 3 two-point conversions this season and the average NFL success rate is less than that.  Either way, Bowles was second-guessed for his conservative approach. 

The Bengals execute two-point conversions at a similar success rate, one of three.  Unlike the Bucs, they tried and lost.  Taylor was criticized not for his decision-making but for his play-calling.

This is the NFL where wins come at a premium, where coaches are hired and fired based on the clutch decisions that they make or don’t make.  Regardless of what the “book” says, the decision to go for two is (or is not) as simple as, when you’re on the road and don’t want the game to go into overtime, go for it. 

Teams that pull it off are rewarded, teams that fail to are thwarted.  Rest assured that plays from the two-yard line are practiced endlessly on offense, as well as on the defensive end.  And why wouldn’t they be as they become an increasingly outcome-determining part of the game, and a coach’s job security, despite success rates being sub-optimal.

It’s easy to sit back on our armchairs and blast a coach for his lack of chutzpah.  There’s no question a successful two-point conversion defeating Kansas City would have been an emotional boost for the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, one they desperately needed.  There’s also no question that a blundered attempt would have set the team back.

As the game continues to evolve and the stakes become higher with each win or loss, I can’t imagine not seeing more two-point conversions attempted.  We’ve already seen it.  It adds an element of intrigue to the game and gives us a look into how coaches, and franchises, operate.  As these decisions continue to be converted or failed, we will also undoubtedly get a glimpse into how many coaches will be looking for a new line of work.

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